

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2659

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 HELSINKI 1369

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IMMEDIATE,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM PCAT UR US
SUBJECT: US/SOVIET CAT: MAY 4 PLENARY

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE FIRST CAT PLENARY OF THE HELSINKI
ROUND SAW THE SOVIETS USING A GOOD NUMBER OF ARGUMENTS WE
MADE FOR RESTRAINT LAST DECEMBER, SPEAKING OF THE
PROBLEM AS HAVING SOME "URGENCY," STATING THEIR WILLING-
NESS TO SEEK COMMON APPROACHES, BUT STILL INSISTING ON
EMPHASIS ON LEGAL/POLITICAL PRINCIPLES. US DELEGATION
HEAD GELB RESPONDED BY REVIEWING THE US DECEMBER PRESENTA-
TION, POINTING OUT NEW US STEPS ON RESTRAINT SINCE THEN,
DESCRIBING RECENT EVENTS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA AS A PRIME
EXAMPLE OF HOW OUR RESPECTIVE ARMS TRANSFERS CAN ADVERSELY
AFFECT BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND CLOSING BY INDICATING
THE NEED FOR A PLAN OF ACTION TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS.
THE SOVIET SIDE IS EXPECTED TO ELABORATE ON ITS POLITICAL/
JURIDICAL APPROACH AT THE MAY 5 PLENARY--ATMOSPHERE IS
GOOD. END SUMMARY

1. AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH, HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION,
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INDICATED SOVIET DESIRE TO BEGIN SERIOUS, PRACTICAL
WORK ON PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH ARMS TRANSFERS AND TO
USE THE TIME IN HELSINKI TO CONSIDER WHAT PROGRESS COULD
BE MADE. MENDELEVICH THEN READ A FORMAL STATEMENT OUT-
LINING THE SOVIET POSITION. HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDED:
-- CAT TALKS ARE ANOTHER FIELD OF SOVIET/AMERICAN CO-
OPERATION;

- THE PROBLEM OF RESTRAINING ARMS TRANSFERS IS URGENT BECAUSE OF THE SCALE ATTAINED;
- THE PROBLEM OF ARMS TRANSFER LIMITATIONS CAN BE EFFECTIVELY SOLVED ONLY WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL MAJOR SUPPLIERS;
- SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES ARE GUIDED BY GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND CARRIED OUT EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH GOVERNMENT CHANNELS WITHOUT ANY COMMERCIAL BENEFITS;
- SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT US TRANSFERS OF LARGE QUANTITIES OF MATERIALS TO AREAS IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO SOVIET TERRITORY;
- SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN APPROPRIATE ACCORD ON RESTRAINING TRANSFERS SHOULD ONE BE ACHIEVED. (MENDELEVICH REPEATED THIS POINT TWICE);
- SOVIETS EXPRESSED THE NEED TO GO BEYOND THE US "MILITARY/TECHNICAL" APPROACH AND NOTED "POLITICAL/JURIDICAL" ASPECTS WERE OF STILL GREATER IMPORTANCE; IGNORING POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL ASPECTS COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE WORLD SITUATION;
- SOVIETS NOTED THERE APPEARED TO BE COMMON GROUND IN POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES.

2. IN RESPONDING TO THE SOVIET STATEMENT, GELB INDICATED THERE WERE NO QUICK OR EASY SOLUTIONS BUT RATHER THAT CONTINUOUS, SERIOUS WORK WAS REQUIRED.
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HE THEN READ THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT CALLING FOR SOVIET COOPERATION IN SEEKING RESTRAINT (MENDELEVICH PROMISED TO TRANSMIT THE STATEMENT TO MOSCOW TODAY FOR CONSIDERATION, WITH GELB REQUESTING IT BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT).

3. GELB THEN BRIEFLY REVIEWED THE POINTS THE US SIDE MADE DURING THE WASHINGTON ROUND, NOTING HIS BELIEF THAT PARALLEL US AND SOVIET INTERESTS IN RESTRAINT ARE CLEAR. HE THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD DONE EXACTLY WHAT HE PROMISED TO DO BY ORDERING A \$740 MILLION REDUCTION IN FY78 ARMS TRANSFERS. GELB SAID THE US COULD SELL BILLIONS OF DOLLARS MORE IN ARMS, NOTED SOME SPECIFIC US REFUSALS, AND POINTED OUT THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON THE PROMOTION OF ARMS SALES BY PRIVATE ARMS MANUFACTURERS. US IS HOLDING TO RESTRAINT IN SPITE OF STRONG AND GROWING DIPLOMATIC AND DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO SELL MORE.

4. GELB THEN INDICATED HE COULD NOT REPORT MUCH PROGRESS IN OBTAINING COOPERATION OF

OTHER SUPPLIERS TO RESTRAIN THEIR ARMS TRANSFERS, SINCE THEY WANTED EVIDENCE OF US-SOVIET RESTRAINT BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES. HE SAID THE US HAD TALKED TO RECIPIENTS TO ENERGIZE AND TO SUPPORT REGIONAL RESTRAINT EFFORTS.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 HELSINKI 1369

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5. GELB SAID THE CURRENT TALKS WERE NOT AN ENTERPRISE FOR REDUCING US-SOVIET SECURITY, BUT RATHER FOR ESTABLISHING AN ARMS CONTROL DEMENSION TO ARMS TRANSFERS. RESTRAINT WOULD NOT ELIMINATE THE CONFLICT OR COMPETITION BETWEEN US. HOWEVER, RESTRAINT WOULD CHANNEL AND SHAPE ARMS TRANSFERS SO THAT UNNECESSARY AND PROVOCATIVE ARMS TRANSFERS WOULD BE LIMITED.

6. GELB REVIEWED IN SOME DETAIL THE RECENT SITUATION IN THE HORN AS A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF HOW ARMS TRANSFERS LEAD TO INCREASING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE US AND USSR. GELB REFERRED TO THE ADVERSE EFFECTS WHICH SOVIET TRANSFERS HAD ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ON AFRICA ITSELF. HE POINTED OUT THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE BEING CALLED UPON TO RIGHT ARMS IMBALANCES CAUSED BY EXCESSIVE SOVIET TRANSFERS.

7. GELB STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING BEYOND PRINCIPLES AND THE POLITICAL/JURIDICAL ASPECTS OF THE

PROBLEM. HE SAID THE SIDES COULD NOT FOCUS ON THESE
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ALONE OR EVEN PRINCIPALLY. GELB THEN REFERRED TO
THE 1972 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE US AND USSR AS AN ALREADY EXISTING DURABLE
FOUNDATION FOR RESTRAINT.

8. GELB CONLUDED HIS REMARKS BY NOTING THE NEED
FOR ACTION. HE SAID THE PROBLEM WAS HOW TO ORGAN-
IZE THIS NEW ARMS CONTROL AREA AND THEN TAKE TACTI-
CAL AND MEANINGFUL STEPS TO IMPLEMENT IDEAS. HE
EXPRESSED THE US VIEW THAT OTHERS WOULD FOLLOW IF
WE COULD BEGIN TO WORK OUT THE PROBLEMS. THIS WAS
A TIME OF OPPORTUNITY TO DO SOMETHING AND IT WAS
IMPORTANT FOR OTHERS TO SEE WE WERE KEEPING THE
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY OPEN.

9. GELB HANDED MENDELEVICH A DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE
FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE SOVIET SIDE.

10. IN RESPONDING TO GELB, MENDELEVICH SAID THE
SOVIETS TOO BELIEVED BOTH SIDES HAD SIMILAR INTERESTS.
HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE THE SOVIETS ATTACHED TO
PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENT. RETURNING TO THE
"POLITICAL/JURIDICAL" THEME, MENDELEVICH SAID HE
COULD NOT IMAGINE AN AGREEMENT ON "MILITARY/
TECHNICAL" MATTERS WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE NO
LESS IMPORTANT "POLITICAL/LEGAL" ASPECTS. THE ARMS
TRANSFER ISSUE WAS ONE SATURATED WITH POLITICAL PROBLEMS,
NOT ONLY INVOLVING US-SOVIET BILATERAL POLICIES BUT
INTERNATIONAL POLICIES AS WELL.

11. IN ALLUDING TO GELB'S REFERENCE TO THE HORN,
MENDELEVICH SAID THE SOVIETS HAD RENDERED SUBSTANTIAL
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA BECAUSE THEY WERE
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HELPING A JUST CAUSE. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THERE
WAS GREAT SOVIET DISILLUSIONMENT ABOUT SOMALI USE
OF SOVIET ARMS FOR AGGRESSIVE PURPOSES AND THAT
THE RESULTS OF THE SOVIETS' ANALYSIS OF THIS PROBLEM
WOULD BE REFLECTED IN A OWRKING DOCUMENT TO BE
PRESENTED TO THE US SIDE AT THE MAY 5 PLENARY.
MENDELEVICH REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE NEED FOR
CAREFUL LISTENING TO WHAT THE OTHER SIDE HAD TO

SAY, AVOID PREJUDICE AND PROPAGANDA CLICHE.
NEVERTHELESS, HE CHIDED THE US ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS
THE HORN WHICH WAS THE SAME TOWARDS BOTH THE AGGRESSOR
AND THE VICTIM.

12. MENDELEVICH SAID THE NEW US POLICY OF RESTRAINT
WAS VERY GOOD, BUT THAT WE WANTED THE SOVIETS TO
JOIN US AND DO APPROXIMATELY THE SAME. THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP BELIEVED THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WAS
SERIOUS. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
WAS DIFFERENT AND IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO DRAW
POSITIVE ELEMENTS FROM THEIR POSITION. THE TASK,
HE CONTINUED, WAS TO ELABORATE A NEW POLICY--COMMON
TO BOTH OF US.

13. IN CONCLUSION, MENDELEVICH NOTED THAT THE PROBLEM
WAS MALTI-FACETED AND IMPOSSIBLE TO SOLVE IN A FEW
DAYS. THE TASK WAS TO FIND A SOUND APPROACH
ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. HE SUPPORTED THE IDEA
OF CONTINUING, SERIOUS CONSULTATIONS ON A REGULAR
BASIS, BUT REQUESTED THAT THE US SIDE NOT BE TOO
QUICK TO REPORT SOME SUCCESS.

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 HELSINKI 1369

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14. GELB CONCLUDED THE ROUND BY TAKING THE SOVIET
POINT ABOUT ACCEPTANCE OF US RESTRAINT POLICY AND NOTED
THE NEED TO WORK FOR HARMONIZATION OF POLICIES. HE
SAID WE MUST BLEND REGIONAL POLITICAL/MILITARY

SITUATIONS WITH GUIDELINES. HE WARNED AGAINST GETTING BOGGED DOWN IN POLITICAL DEBATES OR TO PRETEND WE COULD RESOLVE CERTAIN POLITICAL DIFFERENCES. RATHER, THE US WANTED TO ATTACK THE PROBLEM FROM AN ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVE AND MAINTAIN DISTANCE FROM POLITICAL CONFLICTS. COMMENT: THE SOVIETS HAVE OBVIOUSLY GIVEN CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT TO THE CAT RESTRAINT ISSUE SINCE LAST DECEMBER. KHLESTOV'S COMMENT THEN ABOUT THE US PRESENTATION HAVING STARTED A "CHAIN REACTION" IN SOVIET THINKING HAS BEEN BORNE OUT. THE TONE OF TODAY'S PLENARY WAS VERY CONSTRUCTIVE AND BODES WELL FOR THE REST OF THE ROUND. THE SOVIETS STRUCK A NUMBER OF POSITIVE THEMES, INCLUDING;

- THE URGENT NEED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM;
- THE FACT THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE SOME AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES;

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- THEIR APPARENT WILLINGNESS TO SEE THE TALKS MOVE FROM CONSULTATIONS TO NEGOTIATIONS; AND
- THEIR RECOGNITION OF THREE OF THE FOUR GUIDELINES DISCUSSED BY THE US SIDE IN DECEMBER.

HOWEVER, MENDELEVICH'S REQUEST THAT WE NOT REPORT SUCCESS NOW INDICATES THE SOVIETS ARE STILL HEDGING THEIR BETS AND WISH TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF THE HELSINKI ROUND BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES FURTHER. THEY MAY STILL BE UNSURE ABOUT THE COMMON GROUND BETWEEN US AND HOW IT MIGHT BE USED TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE PROGRESS ON RESTRAINT. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO ACCEPT AT FACE VALUE SOVIET PROFESSIONS OF SERIOUSNESS ABOUT THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT. A GOOD INDICATOR WILL BE THEIR RESPONSE TO THE SUBSTANTIVE DRAFT JOINT COMMUNIQUE HANDED TO THEM AT THE END OF THE ROUND WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE PUBLICLY US-SOVIET COMMITMENT TO A RESTRAINT EFFORT.

THE SOVIETS HAVE THUS FAR HAD TIME ONLY TO SKETCH BRIEFLY THEIR "PRINCIPLED" APPROACH AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT THEY WILL CHOOSE TO STRESS DURING TOMORROW'S PLENARY. MENDELEVICH'S COMMENT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE "POLITICAL/JURIDICAL" ASPECTS OF THE RESTRAINT PROBLEM AND THE NEED FOR THE US TO DRAW ON OTHER "SOURCES" IN DEVELOPING A COMMON POLICY INDICATE WE WILL AT LEAST HAVE TO EXAMINE CAREFULLY THE ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET MAY 5 PRESENTATION TO DETERMINE HOW THEY MIGHT RELATE TO OUR GOAL OF HARMONIZATION OF NATIONAL POLICIES. GIVEN SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO SIGN ON TO THE US RESTRAINT

POLICY, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO WORK TOGETHER WITH
THEM TO TRY TO DEVELOP A COMMON POLICY DURING A LONG
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SERIES OF NEGOTIATIONS. END COMMNET.

BEGIN TEXT OF SOVIET STATEMENT

AS IT HAS BEEN AGREED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR
AND THE USA WE START TODAY CONSULTATIONS ON LIMITATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SUPPLY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THESE
CONSULTATIONS ARE TO BECOME YET ANOTHER FIELD OF SOVIET-AMERICAN
CONTACTS ESTABLISHED AND IMPLEMENTED IN THE HOPE FOR COOPERATION
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES IN STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY.

AT THE PRELIMINARY ROUND IN WASHINGTON IN DECEMBER 1977,
THE AMERICAN SIDE OUTLINED ITS UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM OF
LIMITATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SUPPLY OF CONVENTIONAL
ARMS AND PUT FORTH SOME CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING WAYS TO SOLVE
THIS PROBLEM. WE HAVE THOROUGHLY ANALYZED BOTH THE RESULTS OF

THE PRELIMINARY ROUND OF THE CONSULTATIONS AND THE SUMMARY OF
THE AMERICAN POSITION SENT TO US THROUGH THE U.S. EMBASSY IN
MOSCOW IN JANUARY 1978. NOW WE WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT OUR BASIC
APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT OF THESE CONSULTATIONS.

THIS APPROACH IS ENTIRELY DETERMINED BY THE GENERAL COURSE
OF THE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AS POLICY OF PEACE, STRUGGLE FOR
STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY OF PEOPLES, FOR PREVENTION OF AGGRESSION
WARS, FOR CESSATION OF ARMS RACE AND FOR DISARMEMENT. IN THE SPEECH
MADE BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE C.P.S.U. CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR,
LEONID I. BREZHNEV IN MOSCOW ON APRIL 25 THIS POLICY HAS BEEN
FURTHER DEVELOPED AND SPECIFIED. IN THIS SPEECH CONSIDERABLE
ATTENTION HAS BEEN ALSO GIVEN TO THE TASK TO PUT AN END TO THE
ARMS RACE IN THE FIELD OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. THE PROBLEM
OF LIMITATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SUPPLY OF CONVEN-
TIONAL ARMS IS CONNECTED WITH THIS TASK IN A MOST CLOSE WAY.

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WE IN THE SOVIET UNION PROCEED FROM THE BELIEF THAT THIS PROBLEM IS URGENT AND CALLS FOR APPROPRIATE SOLUTION. IT IS URGENT, FIRST OF ALL, BECAUSE THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE HAS ATTAINED FOR THE LAST FEW YEARS A TREMENDOUS SCALE AND TENDS TO BE ON THE INCREASE. LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS ARE BEING CONCENTRATED IN SOME REGIONS OF THE WORLD INCLUDING THOSE PREVIOUSLY UNAFFECTED. MORE AND MORE STATES ARE DRAWN INTO THE ARMS RACE AND MILITARY BUILD-UP COMPETITION. THE SKY-ROCKETING OF ARMS EXPENDITURE, PARTICULARLY IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, BECOMES A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO THEIR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

SUCH A COURSE OF EVENTS IS IN NO WAY NORMAL. IT DOESN'T CORRESPOND TO THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, THREATENS WITH NEW COMPLICATIONS AND GROWTH OF TENSIONS. BUT STILL MORE DANGEROUS IS THE FACT THAT THE MOST ADVANCED ARMS SOMETIMES FIND THEIR WAY, AND IN GROWING QUANTITIES, INTO THE HANDS OF STATES THAT PURSUE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES, LAY TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AND HATCH HOSTILE PLANS TOWARD OTHER STATES. AS A RESULT THE SITUATION IN THE RESPECTIVE REGIONS IS BEING DESTABILIZED WHICH ADVERSELY AFFECTS THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

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AND IT IS NOT A POLEMIC REMARK BUT A MERE STATEMENT OF THE FACT WHEN WE SAY THAT THE WORLD'S LARGEST SUPPLIER OF ARMS, INCLUDING THE MOST SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS, IS THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. IT APPEARS THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION ITSELF RECOGNIZES THAT THE PRESENT VOLUME OF THE U.S. ARMS TRADE, THE MOST ADVANCED SYSTEMS INCLUDED, IS EXCESSIVE AND SHOULD BE REDUCED. IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT STILL MORE CONCERNED ARE THE STATES WHOSE NEIGHBOURS ACQUIRE HUGE AMOUNTS OF U.S. WEAPONS.

AMERICAN ALLIES ACCOUNT FOR A CONSIDERABLE SHARE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE. WE MENTION THIS BECAUSE, THOUGH OUR CONSULTATIONS ARE SO FAR BILATERAL, THE PROBLEM OF ARMS TRANSFER LIMITATION, OBVIOUSLY, CAN BE EFFECTIVELY SOLVED ONLY WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL MAJOR SUPPLIERS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THIS

SEEMS TO BE REALIZED BY BOTH SIDES.

THE SOVIET UNION, TOO, IS A SUPPLIER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS GUIDED BY THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF OUR POLICY WE PROVIDE SUCH ARMS ONLY IN STRICTLY DEFINITE CASES, EXCLUSIVELY THOUGH GOVERNMENT CHANNELS, WITHOUT ANY COMMERCIAL BENEFIT AIMS.

WE SUPPLY ARMS TO A NUMBER OF STATES - BOTH OUR ALLIES AND THOSE STATES BEFORE WHICH WE HAVE NO ALLIED OBLIGATIONS. WE DO IT TO ENHANCE THEIR CAPABILITIES FOR INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE. WE RENDER ARMS SUPPLY AID TO VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION. WE INVARIABLY SUPPORT PEOPLES FIGHTING AGAINST COLONIALISM AND RECIIST OPPRESSION, FOR THEIR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE. THIS SUPPORT IS BOTH MORAL AND MATERIAL. ALL THIS IS IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. WE DO NOT SUPPLY ARMS TO ANYONE FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSES. IN THIS REGARD THE NOTION OF "RESTRAINT" IN ARMS TRANSFERS IS NOT SOMETHING NEW FOR THE SOVIET UNION. HOWEVER, WE CANNOT BUT TAKE INTO CONCDERATION THE SCALE AND GEOGRAPHY OF ARMS TRANSFERS BY THE U.S.A. AND OTHER ESTERN COUNTRIES, EXPECIALLY WHEN THESE ARMAMENTS ARE TRANSFERRED IN LARGE QUANTITIES TO AREAS IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO OUR TERRITORY.

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THOUGH ARMS SUPPLIES BY THE SOVIET UNION SERVE NO OTHER PURPOSES THAN POLITICALLY JUSTIFIED AND LEGITIMATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW WE DEEM IT PROPER TO EXAMINE MEASURES WHICH WOULD LEADE TO LIMITATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SUPPLY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDS FROM THE ASSUPMTION THAT SUCH MEASURES MAY CONTRIBUTE TO RESTRAINING AND STOPPING THE ARMS RACE. WAYS TOWARD ACCORDS ON SUCH MEASURES SHOULD BE SOUGHT WITHIN THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL DETENTE, STRENGTHENING PEACE, ELIMINATING THE EXISTING HOTBEDS OF WAR AND PREVENTING EMERGENCE OF NEW ONES. SHOULD AN APPROPRIATE ACCORD ON SUCH MEASURES BE ACHIEVED, WE SHALL PARTICIPATE IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION. HOW THEN IN OUR OPINION SHOULD PRACTICAL SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SUPPLIES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS BE TACKLED?

AS WE VIEW IT, THERE ARE TWO SIDES OF THE PROBLEM. ONE IS OF A MILITARY-TECHNICAL NATURE: IT NEEDS TO BE DETERVINED WHAT EXACTLY AND IN WHAT MANNER IS SUBJECT TO LIMITATION, I.E. SALES AND SUPPLY OF WHAT KINDS OF ARMS SHOULD BE BANNED OR LIMITED; SHOULD SUCH LIMITATIONS BE UNIVERSAL OR SELECTIVE; WHAT SHOULD BE THE WAYS OF THEIR PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION AND SO ON? IMMEDIATELY RELATED ARE PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE LIMITATION OF TRANSFERS OF ARMS PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER COUNTRIES, PREVENTION OF RE-EXPORT OF ARMS TO THIRD COUNTRIES AND SOME OTHER QUESTIONS. THESE MILITARY-TECHNICAL ASPECTS WERE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT WORKED OUT BY THE AMERICAN SIDE AND WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM

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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 HELSINKI 1369

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DURING THE CONSULTATIONS, WE MAY HAVE TO ASK THE U.S. DELEGATION
TO CLARIFY SOME ELEMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS. WE ALSO HAVE
SOME IDEAS TO PRESENT. WE INTEND TO RETURN TO ALL THESE PROBLEMS
LATER IN THE COURSE OF THE CONSULTATIONS.

RIGHT NOW, HOWEVER, WE WISH TO EXPRESS WITH ALL CLARITY OUR
FIRM BELIEF THAT NO SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND SUPPLY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS IS POSSIBLE
UNLESS ONE GOES BEYOND ITS MILITARY-TECHNICAL ASPECTS. NO MATTER
HOW IMPORTANT THESE ASPECTS MAY BE, OF STILL GREATER IMPORTANCE
ARE POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL ASPECTS. THE PROBLEM OF WHAT SHOULD
OR SHOULD NOT BE SOLD AND SUPPLIED CANNOT FIND A REASONABLE AND
JUST SOLUTION WITHOUT DETERMINING TO WHOM ARMS MAY OR SHOULD BE
SOLD AND SUPPLIED AND TO WHOM THEY SHOULD NOT BE SOLD AND SUPPLIED
SALES AND TRANSFERS OF ARMS, AS SUCH, ARE NEITHER AN ABSOLUTE EVIL
NOR AN ABSOLUTE GOOD. ALL DEPENDS ON WHO IS THE RECIPIENT OF THE
ARMS AND CONSEQUENTLY WHETHER THEY SERVE A JUST OR INJUST CAUSE.
ONCE SOLD OR SUPPLIED, ARMS BECOME AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF A RECI-
PIENT'S POLICY AND STRATEGY, AN INSTRUMENT FOR ITS AIMS. BUT THE
POLICIES AND AIMS OF DIFFERENT RECIPIENTS ARE FAR FROM BEING THE
SAME.

IN SOME CASES A RECIPIENT STATE MAY SEEK TO STRENGTHEN ITS
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SECURITY IN THE FACE OF AN AGGRESSION, THREATS OR TERRITORIAL

CLAIMS, IN OTHER CASES THE RECIPIENT ITSELF MAY BE PREPARING FOR AN AGGRESSION. A RECIPIENT MAY STRIVE TO PROP UP ITS COLONIAL AND RACIAL SUPREMACY OVER OPPRESSED PEOPLES OR A RECIPIENT MAY, ON THE CONTRARY, STRIVE TO DEFEND HIS JUST RIGHTS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST COLONIAL AND RACIST REGIMES WHICH PURSUE A POLICY CONDEMNED BY THE UNITED NATIONS AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY.

FAR FROM HAVING A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AN AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF TRADE AND SUPPLY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS WHICH IGNORES THESE POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL ASPECTS COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD. ISN'T IT CLEAR THAT IF ARMS TRANSFER RESTRICTION MEASURES ARE APPLIED EQUALLY BOTH TO AN AGGRESSOR AND A VICTIM OF AGGRESSION, IT WOULD BE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE AGGRESSOR. EQUALLY, IT WILL BE COLONIALISTS AND RACISTS WHO WOULD GAIN IF PEOPLES FIGHTING FOR THEIR FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE ARE LEFT WITHOUT ARMS IN THE FACE OF MILITARY POWER OF COLONIAL AND RACIST REGIMES.

ALL THIS LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITATION OF TRADE AND SUPPLY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS MUST INCLUDE THE ELABORATION OF CLEAR AND EXPLICIT POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURIDICAL CRITERIA OF PERMISSABILITY OF SUCH SALES AND SUPPLIES.

SUCH CRITERIA SHOULD BE BASED, OF COURSE, ON AN OBJECTIVE FOUNDATION WHICH REFLECTS JURIDICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY. SUCH A FOUNDATION DOES EXIST. IT IS THE U.N. CHARTER, AND U.N. DECISIONS, MULTILATERAL INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS OF POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL NATURE ADOPTED BY A GREAT NUMBER OF STATES, INCLUDING BOTH OUR COUNTRIES. MUCH USEFUL CAN BE FOUND IN THE JOINT SOVIET-AMERICAN DOCUMENTS FOR DEFINING SUCH CRITERIA.

LATER AS WE PROCEED WITH OUR CONSULTATIONS WE SHALL BE READY TO PRESENT IN A GREATER DETAIL OUR VIEWS CONCERNING THE SPECIFIC CONTENTS OF POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL-JURIDICAL CRITERIA MENTIONED HERE. AT THIS STAGE WE FIND IT APPROPRIATE TO NOTE THAT
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IN THE SUMMARY OF THE AMERICAN POSITION SENT TO US THROUGH THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES IN MOSCOW IN JANUARY 1978 THE AMERICAN SIDE ALSO POINTS TO A CERTAIN INTER-RELATION BETWEEN MILITARY-TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AND CRITERIA OF A MORE GENERAL NATURE MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE AMERICAN SIDE, "WOULD CONSTITUTE A FIRST STEP TOWARD COOPERATION". DOES IT INDICATE THAT THE AMERICAN AND THE SOVIET SIDES THINK SOMEWHAT ALONG THE SAME LINES? IN THIS CONNECTION WE HAVE NOTED THAT AT LEAST ONE CRITERION SUGGESTED BY THE AMERICAN SIDE, I.E. "THE FULFILLMENT OF RECIPIENTS'S LEGITIMATE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS MUST NOT BE JEOPARDIZED", SEEMS TO HAVE SOMETHING IN COMMON WITH OUR IDEA ABOUT A CLEAR AND EXPLICIT JURIDICAL BASIS FOR THE CRITERIA. IF IT IS SO, THEN IT IS, OF COURSE, A POSITIVE ELEMENT.

TO SUM UP, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT FROM THE VIEW-POINT OF THE SOVIET SIDE AT THESE CONSULTATIONS THE DELEGATIONS ARE TO CONSIDER TWO MAJOR SETS OF PROBLEMS THAT NEED TO BE AGREED

UPON: FIRST, UNDER WHAT SITUATIONS AND TO WHAT RECIPIENTS THE SALES AND SUPPLY OF ARMS ARE JUSTIFIED AND PERMISSIBLE AND IN WHICH CASES SUCH SALES AND SUPPLY SHOULD BE FORBIDDEN OR DRASTICALLY LIMITED; SECOND, TRANSFERS OF WHAT TYPES OF ARMS ARE SUBJECT LIMITATIONS, TO WHAT EXTENT AND UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS.

THIS, IN SHORT, IS OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE TASK OF THESE CONSULTATIONS. WE HOPE IT DOES NOT DIFFER WITH THAT OF THE AMERICAN SIDE.

IN CONCLUSION, MR. GELB, LET ME SAY THAT JUST NOW WE ALL ARE AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE ROAD WHICH WE ARE TO COVER TOGETHER IN THE PROCESS OF MUTUALLY CLARIFYING THE POSITIONS OF THE TWO SIDES AND ELABORATING THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FUTURE ACCORDS. THE SOVIET DELEGATION SEES OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IN PASSING FROM THE CONSENT WITH REGARD TO THE TOPIC OF THESE CONSULTATIONS TO A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE SUBJECT OF THE TALKS, THEIR FRAMEWORK, LIMITS AND THEIR PRACTICAL CONTENTS. THIS IS ALWAYS THE INITIAL STAGE OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF RESTRAINING ARMS RACE. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT THIS STAGE OF OUR CONSULTATION MIGHT BE OVER DURING THE CURRENT ROUND.

AS IN ANY SUCH ENTERPRISE, THE SUCCESS WILL DEPEND TO A CONSIDERABLE

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DERABLE DEGREE ON OUR ABILITY TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF A FREE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, FRANKNESS, JOINT CONSTRUCTIVE SEARCH FOR SIMILAR ELEMENTS IN RESPECTIVE POSITIONS AND JOINT EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THESE DIFFERENCES.

IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT THE SOVIET SIDE INTENDS TO PARTICIPATE IN THESE CONSULTATIONS.

END TEXT

RIDGWAY

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